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    The Euro Interbank Repo Market
    (Oxford Univ. Press, 2015-09-16)
    Mancini, Loriano
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    The search for a market design that ensures stable bank funding is at the top of regulators' policy agenda. This paper empirically shows that the central counterparty (CCP)-based euro interbank repo market features this stability. Using a unique and comprehensive data set, we show that the market is resilient during crisis episodes and may even act as a shock absorber, in the sense that repo lending increases with risk, while spreads, maturities, and haircuts remain stable. Our comparison across different repo markets shows that anonymous CCP-based trading, safe collateral, and the absence of an unwind mechanism are the key characteristics to ensure market resilience
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    Scopus© Citations 62
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    Unsecured and Secured Funding
    (2017-06-10)
    Di Filipo, Mario
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    We provide the first joint analysis of the secured and unsecured money markets of the euro area using bank-level data. After the Lehman crisis, two important substitution mechanisms emerge: banks with higher credit risk offset reductions of unsecured borrowing with secured funding. Riskier banks replace unsecured lending by granting more secured loans. However, high leverage and reliance on short-term funding hamper banks' ability to substitute. Moreover, banks enduring money market strains contribute to the credit crunch. Overall, our findings suggest that the secured segment of the euro money market contributes to financial stability, mitigating systemic effects such as short-term funding strains and contagion.
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    The Euro Interbank Repo Market
    (2016-01-04)
    Mancini, Loriano
    ;
    ;
    The search for a market design that ensures stable bank funding is at the top of regulators' policy agenda. This paper empirically shows that the central counterparty (CCP)-based euro interbank repo market features this stability. Using a unique and comprehensive data set, we show that the market is resilient during crisis episodes and may even act as a shock absorber, in the sense that repo lending increases with risk, while spreads, maturities, and haircuts remain stable. Our comparison across different repo markets shows that anonymous CCP-based trading, safe collateral, and the absence of an unwind mechanism are the key characteristics to ensure market resilience.
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