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    Learning Gaps? Attitudes and Beliefs Under Described and Experienced Signals
    (Elsevier BV, 2026-03-25)
    We show that ambiguity attitudes vary systematically with the informativeness of signals. In an experiment varying the strength of signal-event associations, we separate ambiguity attitudes from beliefs within the same choices. When associations must be inferred from sampling (experience), aversion decreases as signals become informative; when associations are fully known (description), aversion shows no response. Insensitivity declines under the strongest signal in both settings, though the evidence is weaker when the association is known. For the analysis of beliefs, the separation proves consequential: raw measures indicate underreaction to information of similar size in both settings, whereas corrected beliefs, unless the assumed priors favor extreme distributions, respond more strongly to the signal under experience than under description. In contrast with the common finding of conservatism in the belief-updating literature, evidence for underreaction is weak and confined to description.
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