Michèle Müller-Itten
Title
Prof. Ph.D.
Last Name
Müller-Itten
First name
Michèle
Email
michele.mueller-itten@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 7608
3 results
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Item type:Publication, Eliciting Learning Ability(2024-12-20)I express an agent's learning ability through a maximal menu of zero welfare. A simple duality links this zero set and posterior-separable learning costs that are common in the Rational Inattention literature. The novel representation helps to elicit the agent's prior belief and perceived learning ability in a simple, cost-effective and versatile way. Relative to existing approaches, the protocol also works when learning cannot be tightly controlled, and when learning produces lasting effects that alter the beliefs or costs in subsequent tasks. An experimental implementation is planned, and the manuscript will be updated once the findings are available.Type:working paper - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Geometric methods for finite rational inattention(2024-01) ;Armenter, R.; Zachary R. StangebyeWe present a geometric approach to the finite Rational Inattention (RI) model, recasting it as a convex optimization problem with reduced dimensionality that is well suited to numerical methods. We provide an algorithm that outperforms existing RI computation techniques in terms of both speed and accuracy in both static and dynamic RI problems. We further introduce methods to quantify the impact of numerical inaccuracy on the model's outcomes and to produce robust predictions regarding the most frequently implemented actions.Type:journal articleJournal:Quantitative EconomicsVolume:15Issue:1DOI:10.3982/QE2050Scopus© Citations 2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Rational Inattention via Ignorance Equivalence(2026-04-30); ;Armenter, RocStangebye, ZacharyWe introduce the concept of the ignorance equivalent to effectively summarize the payoff possibilities of a rationally inattentive (RI) agent. The ignorance equivalent is a unique fictitious action that does not distort learning incentives when added to the agent’s menu, but also makes ignorance optimal. By restating the RI problem as a choice over a richer menu without learning, the approach provides new insights for menu expansion, the formation of consideration sets, and belief elicitation. When RI agents with different learning costs interact, their ignorance equivalents emerge in equilibrium, facilitating trade that allows agents to emulate the first-best learning strategy.Type:working paper