Gebhard Kirchgässner
Former Member
Title
Prof. em. Dr. Dr. h.c.
Last Name
Kirchgässner
First name
Gebhard
Phone
+41 71 224 2347
3 results
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Item type:Publication, On the Effectiveness of Debt Brakes: The Swiss ExperienceThe Swiss fiscal system is characterised by an extensive fiscal federalism with high fiscal autonomy at all governmental levels, by direct popular rights which include fiscal referenda at the cantonal and local levels, and by particular constitutional and/or statutory fiscal restraints in order to prevent excessive public debt. In this paper, the effects of these constitutional clauses on public deficit and debt are investigated. Using a panel of the 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, we provide evidence that fiscal constraints significantly reduce budget deficits, while direct democracy leads to significantly lower public debt.Type:book section - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Sustainable Fiscal Policy in a Federal System: Switzerland as an Example(Palgrave Macmillan, 2005-07-01); - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Effect of Direct Democracy on Income Redistribution: Evidence for SwitzerlandThere is an intensive dispute in political economics about the impact of institutions on income redistribution. While the main focus is on comparison between different forms of representative democracy, the influence of direct democracy on redistribution has attracted much less attention. According to theoretical arguments and previous empirical results, government policies of income redistribution are expected to be more in line with median voter preferences in direct than in representative democracies. In this paper, we find that institutions of direct democracy are associated with lower public spending and revenue, particularly lower welfare spending and broad-based income and property (wealth) tax revenue. Moreover, we estimate a model which explains the determinants of redistribution using panel data provided by the Swiss Federal Tax Office from 1981 to 1997 and a cross section of (representative) individual data from 1992. While our results indicate that less public funds are used to redistribute income and actual redistribution is lower, inequality is not reduced to a lesser extent in direct than in representative democracies for a given initial income distribution. This finding might well indicate the presence of efficiency gains in redistribution policies.Type:discussion paperIssue:No 1837