Guido Cozzi
Title
Prof. PhD
Last Name
Cozzi
First name
Guido
Email
guido.cozzi@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2399
RePec
http://ideas.repec.org/f/pco350.html
2 results
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Item type:Publication, Does intellectual monopoly stimulate or stifle innovation?This study develops an R&D-based growth model with vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or stifles innovation. We analyze the effects of patent protection in the form of blocking patents. We show that patent protection changes the direction of innovation by having asymmetric effects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Calibrating the model and simulating transition dynamics, we find that strengthening the effect of blocking patents stifles vertical innovation and decreases economic growth but increases social welfare due to an increase in horizontal innovation. In light of this finding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patents, it is important to consider their often neglected compositional effects on vertical and horizontal innovation. --------------------------------------------------------------------------------Type:journal articleJournal:European Economic ReviewVolume:56Issue:04Scopus© Citations 82 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Innovation-Specific Patent ProtectionThis study develops an R&D-based growth model that features both vertical and horizontal innovation to shed some light on the current debate on whether patent protection stimulates or sti?es innovation. Specifcally, we analyze the growth and welfare effects of patent protection in the form of profit division between sequential innovators along the quality ladder. We show that patent protection has asymmetric effects on vertical innovation (i.e., quality improvement) and horizontal innovation (i.e., variety expansion). Maximizing the incentives for vertical (horizontal) innovation requires a profit-division rule that assigns the entire flow profit to the entrant (incumbent) of a quality ladder. In light of this finding, we argue that in order to properly analyze the growth and welfare implications of patent protection, it is important to firstly disentangle its different effects on vertical and horizontal innovation.Type:working paperIssue:09-A010