Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
  • Thumbnail Image
    Some of the metrics are blocked by your 
    Item type:Publication,
    Implicit Insurance and Group Risk-Sharing in Technology Adoption: Experiments with Ghanaian Smallholder Farmers
    (2025-08-03) ;
    Jia, Ruo
    ;
    Insurance promotes the adoption of high-risk, high-return technologies. Using a lab-in-the-field and a field experiment in Ghana, we hold insurance coverage equal and compare an explicit, separately priced insurance policy to an implicit guarantee embedded in agricultural input credit. Among individual farmers, explicit insurance yields higher adoption of a high-risk, high-return technology than implicit insurance; this difference diminishes among farmers in groups that share the potential farming losses due to the group joint liability. The pattern can be explained by the fact that farmers perceive explicit insurance as offering better protection than the de facto equivalent implicit insurance; this perceived protection gap is smaller for more educated farmers, who better recognize the equivalence of explicit and implicit insurance; farming groups provide within-group risk sharing, which weakens the role of formal insurance. We rule out alternative explanations including differences in relational or social image considerations, dislike of mandatory bundling, and superior understanding within groups.
    Type:
  • Thumbnail Image
    Some of the metrics are blocked by your 
    Item type:Publication,
    Stimulating Technology Adoption among Low-Income Farmers: A New Index Insurance Design
    (2023-08-07) ;
    Ruo Jia
    ;
    Insurance enables risky investments in new technologies and innovation. Without insurance, low-income farmers decrease agricultural technology investments to limit their uninsured exposure and do not adopt beneficial technologies. This leads to the persistent low-risk, low- return farming cycle. However, traditional index insurance typically has very low uptake rate. Low financial literacy and limited liquidity are commonly identified causes in the literature. This paper designs a novel insurance taking the form of index-based credit exemption to address the two causes. We will examine this new design via a theoretical model of risky input choice, an artifactual experiment, and potentially a randomized field experiment.
    Type: