Anastasia Kartasheva
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Kartasheva
First name
Anastasia
Email
anastasia.kartasheva@unisg.ch
ORCID
Phone
+41 71 224 7995
41 results
Now showing 1 - 10 of 41
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Item type:Publication, Building economic resilience to pandemic risk in Switzerland(2025-03-23); Scopus© Citations 2 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Credit Suisse CoCo wipeout: Facts, misperceptions, and lessons for financial regulation(2023) - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Insurers as Asset Managers and Systemic Risk(Oxford University Press, 2022-06-17); Scopus© Citations 24 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Insurability of Pandemic RisksType:journal articleJournal:Journal of Risk and InsuranceVolume:88Issue:4Scopus© Citations 25 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, CoCo Bonds Issuance and Bank Fragility(Elsivier, 2020-06)Scopus© Citations 47 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, CoCos: A Primer(Bank For International Settlements, 2015-09-15) - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Information Effect of Entry into Credit Ratings Market: The Case of Insurers’ RatingsThe paper analyzes the effect of competition between credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the information content of ratings. We show that a monopolistic CRA pools sellers into multiple rating classes and has partial market coverage. This provides an opportunity for market entry. The entrant designs a rating scale distinct from that of the incumbent. It targets higher-than-average companies in each rating grade of the incumbent's rating scale and employs more stringent rating standards. We use Standard and Poor's (S&P) entry into the market for insurance ratings previously covered by a monopolist, A.M. Best, to empirically test the impact of entry on the information content of ratings. The empirical analysis reveals that S&P required higher standards to assign a rating similar to the one assigned by A.M. Best and that higher-than-average quality insurers in each rating category of A.M. Best chose to receive a second rating from S&P.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Financial EconomicsVolume:106Issue:2Scopus© Citations 72 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Design of Investment Promotion PoliciesOver the last 20 years, developing countries have experienced the massive shift of financing and the operation of infrastructure from the public to the private sector. The paper analyzes how the government agency should structure the investment promotion policy. I develop a sequential contracting model between the government, investors and infrastructure providers and derive several properties of the optimal policy. The policy leaves investors uncertain about the project type and prescribes different levels of government support, in the form of tax or price distortions. However, the optimal policy does not change the expectations of investors about distribution of project returns. I characterize how the optimal policy depends on the revenue generation preferences of the government and the profitability of infrastructure projects in the country.Type:journal articleJournal:International Journal of Industrial OrganizationVolume:30Issue:2Scopus© Citations 5 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The supply of cyber risk insurance(2024-08-29); ; Cyber risk losses are large and growing, yet the cyber insurance market is small. What constraints the insurance industry from providing larger capacity for cyber risk? We argue that while heavy tails and uncertain loss distribution of cyber risk require significant amounts of external contingent capital, the asymmetric information embedded in insuring cyber risk makes external capital prohibitively costly. Hence, risk financing of cyber insurers relies significantly on the internal capital which constraints its supply. We model the cyber insurance risk financing and then test our arguments empirically in the context of the US cyber insurance market. Using an exogenous shock of the non-US affiliated reinsurance tax treatment in 2017, we establish the causal inference that insurers primarily rely on the internal capital market to supply cyber risk insurance. Then, we test which of the features of cyber risk contribute to the cost of external capital and confirm that all of them play a significant role.Type:conference paper