Matias Dewey
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Dewey
First name
Matias
Email
matias.dewey@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 2784
Web Site
6 results
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Item type:Publication, Futurity Beyond the State: Illegal Markets and Imagined Futures in Latin AmericaType:journal articleJournal:Latin American Politics and SocietyScopus© Citations 6 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Political Economy of Law EnforcementThe legal order is the legitimate foundation of liberal democracy. Its incomplete enforcement of the law can therefore appear dysfunctional, reflecting weak institutions, state capture, and corrupt practices. This paper casts doubt on such categorical assessments by systematically examining the reasons for and intentions behind incomplete enforcement. It argues that law enforcement is part of the political process that is deeply affected by the constellation of actors concerned. Choices over law enforcement produce social order that is analytically distinct from the production of legal norms and their formal implementation. By analyzing different types of partial enforcement, its rationales, and intended effects, we propose an approach that studies law enforcement as an integral part of public policy analysis and of the study of socioeconomic orders.Type:journal articleJournal:MaxPo Discussion PaperVolume:21Issue:1 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Governing through non‐enforcement: Regulatory forbearance as industrial policy in advanced economiesPolitical economy scholarship generally assumes that governments are interested in enforcing economic regulations. Cases of non‐enforcement are predominantly studied in the context of developing countries and are chiefly associated with states' deficient institutional capacity. This article casts doubts on these assumptions by showing how governments in advanced democracies manipulate the regulatory regime and generate selective non‐enforcement of economic regulations to shape markets at their discretion. We argue that regulatory forbearance becomes an attractive form of industrial policy when governments are prevented from intervening discretionally in markets due to legal obstacles, which they cannot overcome; or when the productive structure of the country makes alternative forms of intervention unviable. Drawing on the study of tax non‐enforcement in two most‐different cases of strong and weak state capacity such as Germany and Italy, the article theorizes three techniques through which governments manipulate regulatory regimes: legal and organizational sabotage and shirking. By shedding light on the economic logic of forbearance, the article points at non‐enforcement as an overlooked mode of regulatory governance and suggests the need to inquire further into governments' strategic agency behind regulatory regimes.Type:journal articleJournal:Regulation & GovernanceScopus© Citations 41 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, FROM AGORA TO TELEGRAM: THE ORGANIZATION OF DRUG DEALING THROUGH ENCRYPTED MESSAGING APPS(2021-09-16)Type:conference paper - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, From Agora to Telegram: the social organization of drug dealing through encrypted messaging apps(2022); Buzzetti, AndresType:conference lecture