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Martin Brown
Former Member
Title
Prof. Dr.
Last Name
Brown
First name
Martin
Email
martin.brown@unisg.ch
RePec
http://ideas.repec.org/e/pbr129.html
SSRN
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=401168
14 results
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Item type:Publication, Monitoring consumption Switzerland: data, background, and use cases(Springer Open, 2023-03-20); ; ; Lalive, RafaelType:journal articleJournal:Swiss Journal of Economics and StatisticsVolume:159:4Issue:2023Scopus© Citations 7 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Credit booms and busts in emerging markets. The role of bank governance and risk managementWe investigate to what extent corporate governance and risk management mitigate the involvement of banks in credit boom and bust cycles. We study a unique, hand-collected dataset covering 156 banks from Central and Eastern Europe during 2005–2012. We document that stronger risk management is associated with more moderate pre-crisis credit growth but not with fewer credit losses in the crisis. With respect to bank governance, we find that a higher share of foreign members on the supervisory board is associated with less rapid credit growth in the pre-crisis period and a lower level of credit losses during the crisis period.Type:journal articleJournal:The Economics of TransitionVolume:25Issue:3Scopus© Citations 27 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Understanding Bank-Run ContagionWe study experimental coordination games to examine through which transmission channels, and under which information conditions, a panic-based depositor-run at one bank may trigger a panic-based depositor-run at another bank. We find that withdrawals at one bank trigger withdrawals at another bank by increasing players' beliefs that other depositors in their own bank will withdraw, making them more likely to withdraw as well. Importantly though, observed withdrawals affect depositors' beliefs, and are thus contagious, only when depositors know that there are economic linkages between their bank and the observed bank.Type:journal articleJournal:Management ScienceVolume:63Issue:7Scopus© Citations 55 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Information Asymmetry and Foreign Currency Borrowing by Small FirmsWe model how an information asymmetry between the lending bank and the applying firm about the currency structure of firm revenues may affect loan currency choice. Our framework features a trade-off between the lower cost of foreign currency debt and the costs of currency induced loan default. We show that under imperfect information about firm revenues more local earners choose foreign currency loans, as they do not bear the full cost of the corresponding credit risk. This result is consistent with recent evidence showing that information asymmetries may increase foreign currency borrowing by retail clients in the transition economies. => http://www.palgrave-journals.com/ces/journal/vaop/ncurrent/abs/ces20139a.htmlType:journal articleJournal:Comparative Economic StudiesVolume:56Issue:1Scopus© Citations 14 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Competition and Relational Contracts : The Role of Unemployment as a Disciplinary DeviceWhen unemployment prevails, relations with a particular firm are valuable for workers. As a consequence, a worker may adhere to an implicit agreement to provide high effort, even when performance is not third-party enforceable. But can implicit agreements - or relational contracts - also motivate high worker performance when the labor market is tight? We examine this question by implementing an experimental market in which there is an excess demand for labor and the performance of workers is not third-party enforceable. We show that relational contracts emerge in which firms reward performing workers with wages that exceed the going market rate. This motivates workers to provide high effort, even though they could shirk and switch firms. Our results thus suggest that unemployment is not a necessary device to motivate workers. We also discuss how market conditions affect relational contracting by comparing identical labor markets with excess supply and excess demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor compared to a market characterized by unemployment. Surprisingly though, this does not compromise market performanceType:journal articleJournal:Journal of the European Economic AssociationVolume:10Issue:4Scopus© Citations 30 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Who Needs Credit and Who Gets Credit in Eastern Europe?Abstract: Based on survey data covering 8,387 firms in 20 countries we compare the access to bank credit for firms in Eastern Europe to that in selected Western European countries. Our analysis reveals five main results. First, the firm-level determinants of the propensity to apply are similar in Eastern and Western Europe: small and financially opaque firms as well as firms with alternative financing sources are less likely to apply for credit while firms with greater financing needs (exporters) are more likely to apply. The lower rate of loan applications by firms in Eastern Europe compared to Western Europe seems to be partly driven by the stronger presence of foreign banks and the lower level of credit information sharing. Second, while those firms which do apply for credit are rarely denied credit, foreign bank presence is associated with higher loan rejection rates among small firms. The high loan approval rates observed in Eastern and Western Europe result partly from a selection effect: those firms which are more likely to have an application rejected are less likely to apply in the first place. We find evidence that foreign bank presence is associated with higher loan rejection rates among small and government-owned firms. Third, the reasons why firms do not apply for loans differ strongly between the two regions. In Eastern Europe a higher fraction of non-applicants seem to be discouraged by lending conditions, that is, high interest rates and tough collateral requirements, while in Western Europe more firms simply do not need loans. Fourth, credit constraints in Eastern Europe softened in recent years. Firms which were discouraged from applying for credit or denied credit in 2005 were more likely to have a loan in 2008 than to still be credit constrained, especially in countries with better credit information sharing. Finally, credit constraints do affect firm performance in Eastern Europe. In particular, firms which are denied credit or discouraged from applying are less likely to invest in R&D and introduce new productsType:journal articleJournal:Economic PolicyVolume:26Issue:65Scopus© Citations 139 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Foreign currency borrowing by small firms in the transition economiesWe examine the firm- and country-level determinants of foreign currency borrowing by small firms, using information on the most recent loan extended to 3101 firms in 25 transition countries between 2002 and 2005. Our results suggest that foreign currency borrowing is much stronger related to firm-level foreign currency revenues than it is to country-level interest rate differentials. Supporting the conclusion that carry-trade behavior is not the key driver of foreign currency borrowing in our sample we find no evidence that firm-level indicators of distress costs or financial transparency affect loan currency denomination. Overall, our findings suggest that retail clients which do take foreign currency loans are better equipped to bear the corresponding currency risks than is commonly thought. Policy makers should therefore take a closer look at the characteristics of borrowers before implementing regulations which are aimed at curbing foreign currency loans.Type:journal articleJournal:Journal of Financial IntermediationVolume:20Issue:3Scopus© Citations 62 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Emergence of Information Sharing in Credit MarketsWe provide the first systematic empirical analysis of how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones. Lenders may, however, also lose market power by sharing information with competitors. Our results suggest that asymmetric information in the credit market increases the frequency of information sharing between lenders significantly. Stronger competition between lenders reduces information sharing. In credit markets where lenders may fail to coordinate on sharing information, the degree of information asymmetry, rather than lender competition, drives actual information sharing behaviorType:journal articleJournal:Journal of Financial IntermediationVolume:19Issue:2Scopus© Citations 51 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Information Sharing and Credit : Firm-Level Evidence from Transition CountriesWe investigate whether information sharing among banks has affected credit market performance in the transition countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, using a large sample of firm-level data. Our estimates show that information sharing is associated with improved availability and lower cost of credit to firms, and that this correlation is stronger for opaque firms than transparent firms. In cross-sectional estimates, we control for variation in country-level aggregate variables that may affect credit, by examining the differential impact of information sharing across firm types. In panel estimates, we also control for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level and for changes in selected macroeconomic variablesType:journal articleJournal:Journal of Financial IntermediationVolume:18Issue:2Scopus© Citations 237 - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, The Impact of Banking Sector Reform in a Transition Economy : Evidence from KyrgyzstanWe examine the impact of financial sector reform on interest rate levels and spreads using Kyrgyz bank-level data from 1998 to 2005. We find that, in addition to macroeconomic stabilization, structural reforms to the banking sector significantly contributed to lower interest rates. In particular, our results suggest that foreign bank entry and regulatory efforts to increase average bank size were important in reducing deposit rates. In contrast, we find little evidence that banking sector reform or macroeconomic stabilization has impacted interest rate spreadsType:journal articleJournal:Journal of Banking and FinanceVolume:33Issue:9Scopus© Citations 12