Compensation Regulations in Large Banks: Promoting or Preventing the Next Crisis?
Type
conference contribution
Date Issued
2026
Author(s)
Abstract
A series of banking crises in recent years have rekindled the debate across the globe on regulating executive pay and especially on the effects of “excessive” executive compensation. This paper reviews the executive pay regulations currently in place in advanced economies with strong financial sectors. We look at the nature of the regime (regulation or principles), the target group (e.g., the Top Management Team, Material Risk Takers or the entire bank) and variable pay regulations concerning bonus cap, deferrals, and malus or clawback provisions. We find that regulations among major developed economies have neither been completed nor harmonised. Moreover, the literature explicitly studying the effects of executive compensation in banks and financial services on growth, innovation and risks is limited, and there is mixed evidence on the effectiveness of existing regulations. We find that although European countries have enforced stricter regulation, U.S. studies are dominating the literature. We conclude that policymakers are lacking strong empirical foundations to opt for relaxing or increasing executive pay regulation. We discuss the implications and identify research directions to support future policymaking.
Language
English (United States)
HSG Classification
contribution to scientific community
Refereed
Yes
Event Title
Academy of International Business Annual Meeting 2026
Event Location
Manchester, UK
Event Date
June 29-July 3
Subject(s)
Division(s)