Janine Crivelli

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Title
Dr.
Last Name
Crivelli
First name
Janine
Email
janine.crivelli@unisg.ch
Phone
+41 71 224 73 11

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    Item type:Veröffentlichung,
    A Fish Rots from the Head Down: How Founders Lead Startup Fraud
    (SAGE Publications, 2026-05-12)
    Crivelli, Janine  
    ;
    Hess, Manuel  
    ;
    Shepherd, Dean A.
    ;
    Wincent, Joakim
    Despite growing scholarly attention on entrepreneurial misconduct, little is known about how founders shape and sustain fraudulent practices through their influence over employees. Using an in-depth case study of Theranos—a fraudulent startup—we develop a grounded process model that explains how startup fraud is not simply the result of regulatory gaps or individual overreach but a multilevel embedded phenomenon. We provide insights into how founders shape employee responses to fraud in startups, eliciting both resistance and complicity. Employees, in turn, engage in a fluctuating moral evaluation process, oscillating between condoning and condemning fraud. We contribute to the literature on startup fraud by distinguishing it from fraud in established organizations, advancing a social process perspective on employee moral processes, and illuminating how founders enact multilevel influence mechanisms that embed fraud in startup contexts.
    cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:journal article
    Journal:Journal of Management
    DOI:10.1177/01492063261444594
    URI:https://alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/126031
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    Item type:Veröffentlichung,
    INVESTORS AND PIVOTING: HOW INVESTORS ARE PUSHING AND SHAKING ENTREPRENEURS INTO UNCERTAINTY
    (2025)
    Janine Crivelli  
    ;
    Karl Joakim Jerry Vincent  
    Entrepreneurial pivots are often framed as founder-driven responses to market uncertainty. This study challenges that view by theorizing pivoting as a relational process shaped by founder–investor dynamics. Drawing on an inductive theory-building cross-case analysis of pivots, we explore how investor relationships and funding timing influence pivot initiation, type, and execution. We find that founders seeking investment engage in more radical, product-focused pivots, while existing investors drive parallel pivots aimed at scalability—often through customer segment shifts. Crucially, pivot implementation hinges on founders’ perceptions of investor expertise and trust. Our findings advance a relational theory of pivoting, recentering investors in the strategic adaptation of early-stage ventures.
    cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:conference paper
    URI:https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/124423
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    Item type:Veröffentlichung,
    Board Oversight in Start-Up Fraud: Unveiling the Risks of Shared
    (2024)
    Janine Crivelli  
    ;
    Manuel Hess  
    ;
    April J. Spivack
    ;
    Joakim Wincent  
    Research into venture fraud is still scant and there is limited insight for why and how it occurs beyond that the founding entrepreneur usually constitutes the main suspects. In this study, we examine the monitoring behavior of board members in start-up fraud and their potentially compromising relationships with the founding entrepreneur leading the venture. In contrast to emerging recommendations in the literature, our qualitative study of 14 prominent fraud cases exposes the limitations of shared stock ownership between founding entrepreneurs in the executive lead and board members. Whereas guidelines from previous work mostly related to agency theory suggest shared ownership should produce improved alignment with venture goals, we show this alignment mechanism indicates risk of monitoring failures and the perpetuation of insufficient supervision, enabling fraudulent activities among boards and CEOs. Furthermore, our model identifies the founding entrepreneur in the lead as a central issue, alongside a considerable risk of fraud reinforcement mechanisms. This risk is compounded by the tendency of board members to resort to 'freeze' or 'flight' responses as initial coping strategies when detecting fraudulent activities before confronting problems directly.
    cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:conference paper
    URI:https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/120039
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    Item type:Veröffentlichung,
    The Paradox of Shared Ownership: Investigating Board Member Roles in Start-Up Fraud Cases
    (2024)
    Janine Crivelli  
    ;
    Manuel Hess  
    ;
    April J. Spivack
    ;
    Joakim Wincent  
    Research into venture fraud is still scant and there is limited insight for why and how it occurs beyond that the founding entrepreneur usually constitutes the main suspects. In this study, we examine the monitoring behavior of board members in start-up fraud and their potentially compromising relationships with the founding entrepreneur leading the venture. In contrast to emerging recommendations in the literature, our qualitative study of 14 prominent fraud cases exposes the limitations of shared stock ownership between founding entrepreneurs in the executive lead and board members. Whereas guidelines from previous work mostly related to agency theory suggest shared ownership should produce improved alignment with venture goals, we show this alignment mechanism indicates risk of monitoring failures and the perpetuation of insufficient supervision, enabling fraudulent activities among boards and CEOs. Furthermore, our model identifies the founding entrepreneur in the lead as a central issue, alongside a considerable risk of fraud reinforcement mechanisms. This risk is compounded by the tendency of board members to resort to 'freeze' or 'flight' responses as initial coping strategies when detecting fraudulent activities before confronting problems directly.
    cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:conference paper
    URI:https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/120040
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    Item type:Veröffentlichung,
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    Item type:Veröffentlichung,
    Navigating Pivots: The Interplay of Investor Relations and Founder Decision-Making in Ventures
    (2025)
    Janine Crivelli  
    ;
    Karl Joakim Jerry Vincent  
    Who decides to pivot? In this study, we explore how investor relations and financial support influence a founder’s pivoting decisions in new ventures. Drawing on data from 49 venture cases led by founders with varying experience levels, from novice to serial, and spanning different sectors with diverse investor types, we inductively examine how investors impact pivoting. Our analysis considers resource availability, the degree of investor engagement, and the type of pivot decision and implementation associated with the initiators. Our findings reveal that the interplay between founder autonomy, investor involvement, and resource dependencies shapes pivots. Founders without investor engagement independently initiate pivots, focusing on product-level adjustments based on market feedback, often as a signal to attract new investors. In contrast, investors who have funded ventures drive pivots aimed at scalability and market demands, often involving changes to customer segments. Risk-taking in pivoting correlates with resource availability, while resource scarcity often prompts more radical pivots. The implementation of pivots depends on the quality of founder-investor relations.
    cris-layout.advanced-attachment.dc.type:conference contribution
    URI:https://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/handle/20.500.14171/124422